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TFP “growth” has thus been negative for some years now. 
This is unprecedented for any major economy. Japan, for ex-
ample, which is often held up as the example of a stagnating 
economy, never recorded negative TFP growth for any ex-
tended period. In terms of output per employed person, the 
EU recorded at least some growth until the crisis hit, but it 
was already much lower than the US (at least from the 1990s 
onwards). Since 2007 the EU has not made any progress in 
terms of output per person employed, whereas growth has 
continued in the US (Figure 1).
The recent abysmal productivity and growth ﬁ gures are not 
just a freak result of the ﬁ nancial and eurozone crisis. They 
should be seen only as the culmination of a trend which 
started in the mid-1990s. Before then, Europe was catching 
up to the US. Since then the catch-up process has stalled, 
and most recently it has even reversed. Table 1 shows that 
the growth performance of the EU15 deteriorated relative 
to that of the US after 1995 according to any parameter one 
wants to choose: GDP per capita, GDP per employed per-
son, GDP per hours worked or TFP.
For example, in terms of GDP per employed person, the EU 
was growing slightly faster than the US between 1980 and 
1995. By contrast, during the following 15 years (1995-2010), 
the US grew faster than the EU by a cumulative 20 percent-
age points. In terms of GDP per hour worked, the change in 
relative performance is even more striking: for the 15-year 
period before 1995, the EU recorded a growth rate 20 per-
centage points higher than that of the US. Over the following 
15 years, the difference changed sign and the US grew at a 
rate 15 percentage points faster. Moreover, it is not only the 
EU performance relative to the US which has deteriorated, 
but since 1995 there has been an absolute deterioration of all 
productivity measures in the EU15 – but not in the US.
The timing of this deterioration is a puzzle, given that it came 
after Europe undertook a number of major “growth initia-
tives” (see Table 2 for a selective list).
The ﬁ rst big European growth project was the so-called in-
ternal market programme, which consisted of a package of 
hundreds of laws at the EU level explicitly designed to make 
cross-border trade in Europe easier. Authoritative studies of 
the time suggested that the creation of the internal market 
should lead to a boost to GDP growth of 4.5 to 6.5 per cent, 
which, even if distributed over several years, should have in-
creased the measured growth rate (of productivity) by about 
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The European economy is not doing well. Or rather most 
economies in Europe are not doing well. Most of Northern 
Europe is in relatively better shape, with close to full employ-
ment. But even Germany is growing at less than the two per 
cent growth which many regard as necessary for the survival 
of the European welfare state. Most of Southern Europe is 
only gradually emerging from the devastating effects of the 
eurozone crisis, with unemployment receding only gradually 
and a country as big as Italy seemingly stuck in a growth rate 
below one per cent even as risk premia have fallen dramati-
cally. But Europe is more than a collection of special cases. 
There is a broader trend, which affects all countries: growth 
is falling and certainly falling far short of expectations. The 
recipe almost universally recommended is “structural re-
forms”. But this is a recipe that has been tried intensively in 
recent decades, and it has failed.
Moreover, it seems that the low growth problem is particu-
larly acute in Europe. Gordon argues that the sources which 
powered growth in advanced countries might no longer be 
operative today.1 But even if a global trend towards slower 
growth exists, it remains difﬁ cult to explain why, over the last 
ten years, GDP per capita has been almost stagnant in Eu-
rope and why the EU has stopped catching up to the US and 
now risks falling back badly.
One explanation that seems attractive at ﬁ rst sight is that 
Europe needs to invest more. In a comparative perspective, 
however, this is not convincing: Europe has underperformed 
now for a long time, even though its investment has been, 
until rather recently, higher than that of the US. Moreover, 
relative to its stagnant population Europe has put more peo-
ple to work over the last decade. Given the amount of people 
and capital available, Europe should thus be growing strong-
ly. Normally, one expects output growth to exceed the meas-
ured growth in capital and labour because the efﬁ ciency with 
which these factors are being used increases as technol-
ogy improves. The technical term is total factor productivity 
(TFP). However, in Europe output growth has been below the 
level one would expect given the inputs of capital and labour. 
1 R. G o rd o n : The Rise and Fall of America Growth, Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
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difﬁ culties – made it difﬁ cult to detect the beneﬁ cial effects of 
the internal market. However, the productivity numbers con-
tinued to worsen even after the ﬁ nancial crisis of the 1990s 
had been overcome.
Next came the Economic and Monetary Union in 1999, 
which was also expected to increase growth prospects, at 
least temporarily. A major study by the Commission in 1992 
one half of a percentage point.2 However, nothing of that sort 
followed 1992. At the time, it could be argued that the major 
recession which had started around 1991 – and which was 
accompanied until 1995 by a major ﬁ nancial market crisis, 
mostly in the countries which are again today experiencing 
2 P. C e c c h i n i : Europe 1992: the overall challenge, Commission of the 
European Communities, SEC (88) 524 ﬁ nal, 13 April 1988.
Growth
1995-2010
Change in growth rate 
1980-1995 versus 1995-2010
EU15 US EU15 US
GDP per 
capita




13.8 31.8 +6.0 +20.8
GDP per 
hours worked
19.8 35.0 -25.3 +9.9
TFP 6.8 18.1 -11.6 +0.9
Figure 1
Growth rate in cumulative output per person employed, 
in constant prices, relative to base year (1990)
in %
Table 1
Change in growth performance, EU15 and US, 1995-
2010
in %
S o u rc e : Own calculations based on AMECO data.
S o u rc e : Own calculations based on AMECO data.
Table 2
Major EU reform efforts and their expected growth impact as ofﬁ cially estimated
S o u rc e s : 1 P. C e c c h i n i : Europe 1992: the overall challenge, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (88) 524 ﬁ nal, 13 April 1988; 2 M. E m -
e r s o n , D. G ro s , A. I t a l i a n e r, J. P i s a n i - F e r r y, H. R e i c h e n b a c h : One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Beneﬁ ts and Costs of 
Forming an Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford 1992, Oxford University Press; 3 See M. G i a n n e t t i , L. G u i s o , T. J a p p e l l i , M. P a g a n o : Financial 
Market Integration, Corporate Financing and Economic Growth, European Economy, Economic Papers No. 179, European Commission, 2002; 4 J. M o n -
t e a g u d o , A. R u t k o w s k i , D. L o re n z a n i : The economic impact of the Services Directive: A ﬁ rst assessment following implementation, European 
Economy, Economic Papers No. 456, European Commission, June 2012; 5 J. A r n o l d , P. H o e l l e r, M. M o rg a n , A. W ö rg ö t t e r : Structural Reforms and 
the Beneﬁ ts of the Enlarged EU Internal Market: Much Achieved and Much to Do, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 694, OECD, 2009, 
pp. 16-17; 6 International Monetary Fund: Jobs and Growth: Supporting the European Recovery, Washington DC 2014, International Monetary Fund; 
7 G.M.M. G e l a u f f , A.M. L e j o u r : The new Lisbon Strategy. An estimation of the economic impact of reaching ﬁ ve Lisbon Targets, Industrial Policy and 
Economic Reforms Papers No. 1, European Commission, 2006; 8 A .  H o b z a , G. M o u r re : Quantifying the potential macroeconomic effects of the Europe 
2020 strategy: stylized scenarios, ECFIN Economic Papers 424, European Commission, September 2010.
Reform Expected beneﬁ ts
Internal Market (1992) 2% output gain through economies of scale. Further efﬁ ciency gains through stronger competition, total 
4.5-6.5% of GDP.1
Economic and Monetary Union (1999) Static gains (elimination of transactions costs): 0.5% of GDP. Dynamic gains much higher but no ﬁ gure.2
Financial Services (2002) Up to 1% increase in GDP.3
Services Directive (2005) GDP increase of 0.8% for the state of implementation in 2011. Up to 1.6% of all services actually affected by 
the Directive are included (plus large FDI increase).4
OECD: beneﬁ ts from deregulation at 
national level
Labour productivity increase by 10%. Beneﬁ ts derived from aligning product market regulation to interna-
tional best practice (often within EU).5
IMF: recovery from crisis through reforms Increase in GDP of 4% in medium run and up to 12% in long run.6
Lisbon Strategy (2000) Implicitly 3% growth. Beneﬁ ts of reaching R&D, employment and education targets and completing internal 
market for services: GDP up 12-23%.7
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cord. However, recent publications by the IMF and the OECD 
again promise output gains of between four and twelve per 
cent from a set of product and labour market reforms.7 This 
call for “more of the same” is difﬁ cult to sell to a public which 
sees its living standards stagnating despite all the integration 
and reform activity at the EU and the national level.
So, should one stop talking about structural reforms? Not 
necessarily. The countries which did not undertake reforms 
were hit the hardest by the crisis, and those with the most 
ﬂ exible economies (e.g. Ireland) were the quickest to recover. 
Thus, it appears that countries which implement structural 
reforms are doing just okay, while countries that do not un-
dertake reform efforts do not merely stagnate but risk falling 
behind. European policy makers seem to be condemned to 
continuously row against a current. Those rowing vigorously 
make little headway, but those who do not undertake this ef-
fort fall back.
What is the nature of this current pushing in a negative di-
rection? It is unlikely to be due to globalisation and the rapid 
growth of the emerging economies, since other large mature 
economies are subject to a similar negative inﬂ uence – and 
indeed, the EU has been better at exporting to the emerg-
ing economies than, for example, the US. Moreover, the US 
should be affected by globalisation in a similar way as the EU, 
but there has been no similar deterioration in the performance 
of the US since 1995. On the contrary, the US experienced a 
(temporary) increase of productivity after the mid-1990s.
Until they are able to diagnose with some precision the forces 
that push Europe backwards, European policy makers should 
be careful not to promise too much from structural reforms.
7 See International Monetary Fund: Jobs and Growth: Supporting the 
European Recovery, Washington DC 2014, International Monetary 
Fund; and OECD: Economic Challenges and Policy Recommenda-
tions for the Euro Area, Better Policies Series, February 2014.
entitled “One Market, One Money” argued that the beneﬁ t 
from eliminating currency exchange costs and lower interest 
rates in some countries should constitute a signiﬁ cant boost 
to growth and productivity.3
Other EU structural reform efforts since then include the lib-
eralisation of the markets for ﬁ nancial services and the so-
called services directive, which was approved by the EU with 
considerable controversy in 2005, with the aim of facilitating 
the cross-border provision of services. In both cases, the 
liberalisation was sold with the argument that this would re-
sult in signiﬁ cant welfare gains.4 Moreover, during the early 
2000s, a number of EU countries liberalised their economies 
in major ways. According to the OECD’s product market reg-
ulation (PMR) indicators, every EU country removed restric-
tions (Figure 2).
As a result, the distance between the EU average and the 
US (generally considered the most liberal among the ma-
jor OECD economies) shrunk by half. Inﬂ uential research by 
OECD economists purported to show that full liberalisation, 
as measured by these indices, should potentially lead to dou-
ble-digit gains in output.5 Given that many EU countries have 
undertaken reforms (as measured by the OECD PMR indica-
tors) which have halved the distance between them and the 
US, it is difﬁ cult to explain why growth has not picked up.
After an EU summit in Portugal in 2000, the EU even had the 
implicit growth target of three per cent, under the headline 
banner of the Lisbon Strategy, which aimed to make the EU 
the “most competitive” economy in the world. Studies by the 
Commission argued that the full implementation of the Lis-
bon Strategy should lead to an increase in GDP of 12-20%.6
Conclusion
The mantra that structural reforms will deliver vigorous 
growth cannot be veriﬁ ed based on the EU’s own growth re-
3 M. E m e r s o n , D. G ro s , A. I t a l i a n e r, J. P i s a n i - F e r r y, H. R e -
i c h e n b a c h : One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential 
Beneﬁ ts and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union, Ox-
ford 1992, Oxford University Press, p. 354.
4 See M. G i a n n e t t i , L. G u i s o , T. J a p p e l l i , M. P a g a n o : Financial 
Market Integration, Corporate Financing and Economic Growth, Eu-
ropean Economy, Economic Papers No. 179, European Commission, 
2002; and J. M o n t e a g u d o , A. R u t k o w s k i , D. L o re n z a n i : The 
economic impact of the Services Directive: A ﬁ rst assessment follow-
ing implementation, European Economy, Economic Papers No. 456, 
European Commission, June 2012, pp. 33-34.
5 J. A r n o l d , P. H o e l l e r, M. M o rg a n , A. W ö rg ö t t e r : Structural 
Reforms and the Beneﬁ ts of the Enlarged EU Internal Market: Much 
Achieved and Much to Do, OECD Economics Department Working 
Paper No. 694, OECD, 2009, pp. 16-17.
6 G.M.M. G e l a u f f , A.M. L e j o u r : The new Lisbon Strategy. An estima-
tion of the economic impact of reaching ﬁ ve Lisbon Targets, Industrial 
Policy and Economic Reforms Papers No. 1, European Commission, 
2006.
Figure 2
OECD product market regulation indicators: US 
versus selected EU countries
PMR score
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